v.

ELDON VAIL,

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

ROBERT CURTIS TEALL,

Plaintiff,

No. C09-565Z

ORDER

Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on objections, docket no. 23, to the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue, docket no. 13. These objections were filed by counsel appointed to represent Robert Teall on Grounds 1-5 of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. <u>See</u> Order at 5 (docket no. 15). Having reviewed the objections, the declarations of petitioner and counsel, and the brief of respondent, the Court enters the following Order.

With respect to Grounds 1-5, petitioner procedurally defaulted by failing to seek discretionary review by the Washington Supreme Court of the dismissal of his personal restraint petition ("PRP"). Appointed counsel concedes that petitioner is unable to present the evidence of actual innocence required to satisfy the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard for avoiding the consequences of procedural default. Thus, petitioner can proceed

on Grounds 1-5 of his habeas petition only if he establishes "cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice." *See Robinson v. Ignacio*, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). A showing of "cause" ordinarily turns on an objective factor or impediment external to the petitioner, for example "government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim's factual basis." *Id.* (quoting *Pizzuto v. Arave*, 280 F.3d 949, 975 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing *McCleskey v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991))).

In the pending case, petitioner's assertion of "cause" is based on (i) his educational limitations, unfamiliarity with the law, and minimal literacy; (ii) mental and physical disabilities resulting from a stroke; (iii) mental illness from which petitioner has suffered for several years and for which petitioner currently takes medication; (iv) reliance on the inadequate advice of a "jailhouse lawyer" and unavailability of that same "jailhouse lawyer" after the PRP at issue was dismissed; and (v) inability to secure an alternative "jailhouse lawyer" for fear of reprisal if other inmates discovered the nature of the crime for which petitioner was convicted. The Court is unpersuaded that any of these reasons constitute the "cause" necessary to excuse the procedural default at issue.

Illiteracy has previously been rejected as a legitimate "cause" for failing to present claims to the state's highest court. *Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections*, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) ("To hold that illiteracy is a legitimate cause for failing to appeal to the state supreme court would allow petitioners to wait until the jurisdictional period lapses and then proceed directly to federal court. Such a result would be contrary to the principles of comity underlying the cause and prejudice rule."). Likewise, mental disabilities or disorders that do not substantially affect a petitioner's capacity to appreciate his or her position and make rational choices with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation are not sufficient "cause." *See Sims v. Dwyer*, 2006 WL 2385262 (E.D. Mo.); *see also Bermudez v. Lewis*, 58 Fed. Appx. 268 (9th Cir. 2003); *Stanley v. Lockhart*, 941 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1991). Petitioner indicates that he suffered a stroke in August 2007, as a result of which his "ability

25

26